Edwin F. Guyon v. Fibro Trust : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1993
Edwin F. Guyon v. Fibro Trust : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Edwin F. Guyon; Attorney for Appellee.
Mitchell R. Barker; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Guyon v. Trust, No. 930285 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5166
r 
L 
K 
t 
J 
ii\. 
~AH 
FU 
1 
• i i _ . 
TNO. 
T OF APPEALS 
J* 
^21$ 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
EDWIN F. GUYON 
plaintiff/appellee 
vs. 
FIBRO TRUST 
defendant/appellant 
930285-CA - Court of Appeals 
92016413-CV - District Court 
Priority Argument 
Classification 15 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE 
EDWIN F. GUYON 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL L. HUTCHINGS PRESIDING 
Mitchell R. Barker - 4530 
attorney for defendant/appel 
349 East 200 South, #170 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
801/364-5145 
ant 
Edwin F. Guyon - 1284 
plaintiff/appellee 
205 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
801/355-8811 
84111 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
EDWIN F. GUYON 
plaint iff/appellee 
vs. 
FIBRO TRUST 
defendant/appellant 
930285-CA - Court of Appeals 
92016413-CV - District Court 
Priority Argument 
Classification 15 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE 
EDWIN F. GUYON 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL L. HUTCHINGS PRESIDING 
Mitchell R. Barker - 4530 
attorney for defendant/appellant 
349 East 200 South, #170 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
801/364-5145 
Edwin F. Guyon - 1284 
plaint iff/appellee 
205 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
801/355-8811 
84111 
LIST OF PARTIES 
(A) Edwin F- Guyon (plaintiff) - an attorney licensed to 
practice law in the state of Utah* 
(B) Fibro Trust (defendant) - a trust doing business in 
the state of Utah through its agent Donald H. Pickett and George 
Badger, a twice convicted federal felon (pp.72-79). 
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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The court of appeals has jurisdiction of this action 
pursuant to the provisions of sec. 78-2a-2(d), Utah Code Annotated 
and Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Whether the circuit court abused 
failing to grant defendants motion to set 
judgment herein rendered. 
STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
Rule 55(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
For good cause shown the court may set aside an 
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been 
entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with 
Rule 60(b). 
Rule 60(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party 
or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . or 
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation 
of the judgment. . . . A motion under this Subdivision 
<b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend 
its operation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a court order denying defendants 
motion to set aside a default judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Prior to May 14, 1991, plaintiff, subsequent to 
negotiation with George Badger, agreed to provide certain legal 
services for and on behalf of George Badger, Leasing Technology 
Incorporated, and Fibro Trust at the rate of $100 per hour plus 
its discretion in 
aside the default 
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costs and expenses with the provision that, should there be a 
failure to timely pay said billings, additional services would be 
billed at the rate of $150 per hour* (pp. 25, 49) 
2. In response to the below referenced bi 1 1 ings certain 
payments were made, save and except for those outstanding at the 
time of the filing of the complaint herein, (pp. 25, 49) 
3. On October 26, 1991, pursuant to instructions 
received from George Badger, plaintiff submitted a billing for 
legal services rendered to Mr* Philip Johnson, c/o Leasing 
Technology, Inc., 50 West Broadway, #1000, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
84101. (exhibit A) (pp. 25, 31-32, 49) 
4. On February 14, 1992, pursuant to instructions 
received from George Badger, plaintiff submitted a billing for 
legal services rendered to Mr. Philip Johnson, c/o Leasing 
Technology, Inc., 50 West Broadway, #1000, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
84101. (exhibit B) (pp. 26, 33-35, 49) 
5. On May 8, 1992, pursuant to instructions received 
from George Badger, plaintiff submitted a billing for legal 
services rendered to George Badger, 550 Northmont, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84103. (exhibit C) (pp. 26, 36-37, 49) 
6. On July 6, 1992, pursuant to instructions received 
from George Badger, plaintiff submitted a billing for legal 
services rendered to George Badger, 550 Northmont, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84103. (exhibit D) (pp. 26, 38, 49) 
7. On October 20, 1992, pursuant to instructions 
received from George Badger, plaintiff submitted a billing for 
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legal services rendered to George Badger, 550 Northmont, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84103. (exhibit E) (pp. 26, 39, 49) 
8* On November 3, 1992, pursuant to instructions 
received from George Badger, plaintiff forwarded notice of the 
continued failure to make payment for legal services rendered and 
notice of withdrawal from pending litigation to George Badger, 550 
Northmont, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84103. (exhibit F) (pp. 26, 40-
41, 49) 
9. On November 13, 1992, pursuant to instructions 
received from George Badger, plaintiff submitted information 
regarding status of current litigation and submitted a billing for 
legal services rendered to George Badger, 550 Northmont, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 84103. (exhibit G) (pp. 26, 42-44, 49 and 18-20, 48) 
10. On November 20, 1992 George Badger forwarded a 
letter to plaintiff indicating the existence of "misunderstandings" 
regarding the payment of fees for legal services rendered, (exhibit 
H) (pp. 27, 45, 49 and 21, 48) 
11. On November 25, 1992 plaintiff filed the instant 
action seeking payment for legal services rendered and for which 
payment had not been received, (pp. 27, 1) 
12. On November 28, 1992 defendant was served with 
summons and complaint, (pp. 27, 2) 
13. On December 8, 1992 defendant forwarded a letter to 
plaintiff stating defendants position regarding the payment of 
legal fees for services rendered. (exhibit I) (pp. 27, 46, 49) 
14. On December 29, 1992, based upon the failure of 
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defendant to answer plaintiff's complaint, the court entered 
judgment in favor of plaintiff, (p. 5) 
15. On February 17, 1993, plaintiff became aware said 
judgment had been entered and forwarded to defendant a notice of 
judgment and affidavit of costs, (pp. 6, 7) 
16. On February 23, 1993 defendant forwarded to 
plaintiff its motion to set aside default judgment and accompanying 
memorandum. Said motion/memorandum does not set forth specific and 
sufficiently detailed facts which, if proven, would have resulted 
in a judgment different from the one entered, (p. 9ff) 
17. On April 6, 1993, and subsequent to notice and 
hearing, the circuit court entered its order denying defendant's 
motion to set aside default judgment. <p. 56) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment rendered 
herein. 
Defendant does not demonstrate upon the record any of the 
following: 
A. good cause to set aside entry of default 
or default judgment; 
B. a defense of at least ostensible merit to 
justify trial on the issues; 
C. mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; 
D. that illness alone is a sufficient excuse 
to set aside a default judgment; or 
E. lack of indifference or diligence in 
pursing the opportunity to defendant the action. 
as contemplated by the statutes and cases herein cited. 
ARGUMENT 
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1. Rule 55(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that: 
For good cause shown the court may set aside an 
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been 
entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with 
Rule 60(b). [emphasis added] 
2. A party seeking to set aside a default judgment must 
proffer a defense of at least ostensible merit to justify a trial 
on the issues* Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 
507 (Utah 1976). 
3. Rule 60(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party 
or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . or 
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation 
of the judgment. . . . A motion under this Subdivision 
(b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend 
its operation. 
4. It is discretionary with the trial court to 
determine whether movant shows, "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, 
or excusable neglect". Larsen v. Col 1ina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984). 
5. Illness alone is not a sufficient excuse to make 
neglect in failing to defend a cause of action a ground for 
vacating even a default judgment. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co.. 260 
P.2d 741 (Utah 1984). 
6. Sustaining a default judgment is proper where 
statements and/or actions of defendant demonstrate indifference and 
lack of diligence in pursuing the opportunity to defend and action. 
Russel1 v. Martel1. 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984). 
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7. In order to obtain relief from a default judgment, 
a defendant must show not only that the judgment was entered 
through a reason specified in Rule 60(b), but also the existence of 
a meritorious defense. A meritorious defense is defined as being 
one which sets forth specific and sufficiently detailed facts 
which, if prove, would have resulted in a judgment different from 
the one entered* State ex reL Utah State Department of Social 
Services v. Musselman. 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983). 
CONCLUSIONS 
Defendant Fibro Trust's appeal should be dismissed with 
prejudice and the judgment and orders entered by the third circuit 
court should be affirmed for the following reasons: 
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment rendered 
herein. 
Defendant is not entitled to relief from the judgment 
entered December 29, 1992 pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) on the grounds 
of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. 
Defendant is not entitled to relief from the judgment 
entered December 29, 1992 pursuant to Rule 60(b)(7). 
Defendant is not entitled to relief from the judgment 
entered August 27, 1992 pursuant to its Rule 60(b) claim of ill 
health alleged on behalf defendant trust's agent. 
Defendant has not presented facts sufficient to 
demonstrate a meritorious defense and is not entitled to relief 
from the judgment herein entered. 
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Dated the 25th day of October , 1993. 
^ g s ^ y 
Gil/yon, p l a i n t i ^ / a p p e l lee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the above date I hand-delivered 
an original and eight <8> copies of the foregoing brief of 
plaintiff/appellee to the clerk of the court of appeals, 400 
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84102 and 
two <2> copies were mailed to Mitchell R. Barker, Esq., 349 East 
200 South, #170, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111. 
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